Economic reforms and industrial policy in a panel of Chinese cities by Alder, Simon et al.
UBS Center Working Paper Series
Working Paper No. 5, November 2013
ISSN 2296-2751 (Print)
ISSN 2296-2778 (Online)
Economic Reforms and Industrial Policy  
in a Panel of Chinese Cities
Simon Alder
Lin Shao 
Fabrizio Zilibotti

About the UBS International Center of Economics in Society
The UBS International Center of Economics in Society, UBS Center in short, 
is an Associated Institute at the Department of Economics of the University of 
Zurich. It was established in 2012, enabled by a founding donation by UBS, 
which the bank made on the occasion of its 150th anniversary. In view of the 
very generous donation, the university named the UBS Center after its bene-
factor. The new center of excellence serves two main aims, the first of which 
is to finance world-class research in economics on all levels, to be conducted 
at the University’s Department of Economics. It thereby supports the depart-
ment’s ambition to further strengthen its position as one of the top economics 
departments in Europe and to make Zurich one of the best places for research 
in economics in the world. The Center’s other aim is to serve as a platform for 
dialogue between academia, business, politics, and the broader public, foster-
ing continuous knowledge transfer in the process. Delivering on these aims 
will in turn also contribute to the quality of Zurich, and Switzerland more 
generally, as leading locations for education and business.

Economic Reforms  
and Industrial Policy  
in a Panel of Chinese Cities
Simon Alder, University of Zurich
Lin Shao, Washington University 
in St. Louis 
Fabrizio Zilibotti, University of 
Zurich and UBS International 
Center of Economics in Society
 Abstract
The process of economic reforms launched in 1978, and gradually extended until 
current days, has catapulted China into a stellar growth trajectory that has proven 
highly resilient. In this paper, we estimate the effect on economic development of 
China’s industrial policy, in particular, the establishment of Special Economic Zones 
(SEZ), a salient economic reform. We use data from a panel of 276 Chinese cities 
and prefectures from 1988 to 2010. Our difference-in-difference estimator exploits 
the variation in the establishment of SEZ across time and space. We find that the 
establishment of a state-level SEZ is associated with an increase in the level of GDP 
of about 20%, but not with a permanently steeper growth path. This finding is con-
firmed with alternative specifications and in a sub-sample of inland provinces, where 
the selection of cities to host the zones was based on administrative criteria. Decom-
posing the effect of SEZ on GDP into different channels shows that this worked 
mainly through the accumulation of physical capital, although there is some evidence 
of increasing productivity and human capital investments. Using light intensity as an 
alternative measure for economic activity confirms the positive effects of SEZ.
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I. Introduction
The process of economic reforms launched in 1978, and gradually extended until
current days, has catapulted China into a stellar growth trajectory that has proven
highly resilient. These reforms affect a variety of policies and institutions. Even
today, it is difficult to pinpoint which of its components were crucial. Yet, disen-
tangling the sources of China’s development boom is key to an accurate appraisal
of its experience. China’s transition has been fostered by economic institutions that
differ significantly from those adopted by Western economies. For instance, mar-
ket liberalization has gone hand-in-hand with a set of proactive industrial policies
granting special status and privileges to specific cities, industries and regions. State
intervention continues to play a major role in the economic activity today. While
liberalization is a centerpiece of the orthodox doctrine, the imbalances and distor-
tions to resource allocation imposed by China’s industrial policy run against the
tenets of the Washington consensus.
This paper aims at contributing to a better understanding of the policy roots of
China’s success by focusing on industrial policy. We exploit the variation across
cities and years in the establishment of different types of Special Economic Zones
(SEZ) to estimate the effects of SEZ on economic development. SEZ are a salient
component of the reform process for a variety of reasons. First, they have been a
centerpiece of the gradualist development strategy based on the learning-through-
experimentation principle. Second, they have fostered an uneven development across
geographic areas and sectors – possibly exacerbating inequality. Last but not least
important, their effects are easier to measure than those of other reforms, as they
took the form of well-defined changes in the legal status staggered across different
Chinese regions and cities. The first SEZ were introduced as experiments in market
allocation in geographically restricted areas along the coast. SEZ enjoyed special
rules applying to labor markets, foreign direct investments, firms’ ownership, and
export controls. Another important difference from the rest of the country is that
local political leaders were granted substantial autonomy and could shape key as-
pects of the industrial policy. After the success of the early experiments, SEZ were
extended first to other cities along the coast and then, starting in the early 1990s,
to inland regions. The establishment of new zones has continued until today. For
instance, on September 29, 2013, the government of Li Keqiang has launched the
Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone in the Pudong area, that will enjoy both full liber-
alization of foreign trade and capital market liberalization – the innovative aspect
of this new zone. Although too recent to assess, the new experiment shows that the
guiding principle of the SEZ continues to inform China’s economic reform strategy.
We use a panel of 276 cities over the period 1988-2010 to compare development
across treated and non-treated cities. Our econometric strategy is a difference-in-
difference estimator controlling for time-invariant heterogeneity at the city level. We
also control for province-specific shocks by using province×time fixed effects. We
first regress (the logarithm of) GDP on a reform indicator that switches on (i.e.,
takes the unit value) in the year after a city has received SEZ status, controlling
for city characteristics such as size and population. In our baseline specification,
the introduction of a SEZ is associated with a permanent increase in the city’s
GDP level of about 12%. The result is robust to controlling for local government
spending. To account for gradual effects of the reform, we also consider more flexible
specifications where the effect of the reform is allowed to vary, both parametrically
and non-parametrically, as a function of the time elapsed since the start of the
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flattens out after about ten years; the long-term effect of a SEZ is estimated to be
a differential increase of about 20% in the GDP level.
Our analysis is subject to two important caveats. First, the assignment of cities
to treatment and control groups may not be random. The Chinese government
might have selected cities based on some prior knowledge that the conditions for
industrial development might be especially favorable (”picking winners”), or to the
opposite, in order to curb regional inequality. One might suspect the picking winners
strategy to have been especially important in the first stage of the reforms, when
all SEZ were chosen along the coast and close to potential trading partners and
investors such as Hong Kong and Taiwan. Ideally, one would like to have valid
instruments to isolate exogenous sources of variation in the reform treatment, but
finding instruments is difficult in practice. We mitigate the concern with endogeneity
through two complementary strategies. First, we restrict the sample to cities located
in inland provinces where the selection of the zones was largely based on a rigid
administrative criterion, i.e., being a provincial capital. Second, we augment the
regressions with indicators for the immediate pre-reform years to capture differential
trends. The results are reassuring in both cases: the effect of SEZ is robust in the
restricted sample, and the pseudo-effects before the actual establishment of the zone
are insignificant. Therefore, there appears to be a clear structural break around the
reform year.
The second caveat concerns data quality. One might worry that local statistics be
manipulated strategically by local officers in order to create the impression that an
SEZ was successful so as to attract government support. In addition, while city-level
nominal GDP data are available, city-level price deflators are more problematic (and
only available for fewer cities/years). In our main specification, we use only nominal
variables. The inclusion of city fixed effects removes any bias arising from time-
invarying price level differences. Inflation differences across provinces are absorbed
by the interaction between time and province fixed effects. Yet, this leaves open the
possibility that different cities within the same province may experience different
inflation rates. This would be a problem for our strategy if the SEZ status triggers
systematically higher inflation rates, as in this case part of our estimated effect would
be due to inflation. To address this concern, we first document that, in the more
restricted sample for which we have data on prices at the city level, treated cities do
not appear to have experienced higher inflation than did cities without SEZ. Next,
we complement our analysis with alternative proxies of GDP that do not depend
on prices: light intensity measured by satellites and electricity consumption. The
results confirm the existence of robust significant effects of SEZ.
We also study the channels through which GDP increased as cities were granted
SEZ status. First, we show that the treatment effect is positive and highly signifi-
cant when one considers GDP per capita, instead of GDP levels, as the dependent
variable. The estimated coefficient is almost identical between coastal and inland
cities. Second, the treatment effect is strong and significant for capital labor ratios,
showing that SEZ attract investments and trigger capital deepening. The effect on
total factor productivity (TFP) and human capital also are positive, although with
some caveats. For TFP the effect is positive and significant in the total sample, but
insignificant (albeit positive) in the inland sample. The results for human capital
are subject to data constraints, as census data are only available for three years.
When we restrict the sample to census years, we find that the introduction of SEZ
3has a large and significant effect on the share of college graduates in the population.
Finally, one might suspect that the SEZ led to a concentration of resources in
the SEZ, drawing resources away from adjacent areas. We find no evidence of such
beggar-thy-neighbor effects. When we run our regressions at the prefectural level, a
larger administrative unit that includes both the city core (our main unit of analysis)
and a large surrounding periphery, and exclude the city core (where SEZ are hosted)
we continue to find large positive effects. This suggests that there were no negative
spillovers within prefectures, where if anything, crowding-in effects appear to prevail.
However, our analysis cannot rule out negative externality across prefectures.
A. Related Literature
Our paper is related to a large literature on the effects of policy changes on eco-
nomic development. We contribute to this literature by showing the effects of an
important component of industrial policy in China. We are not first to study the
effects of China’s SEZ, although earlier studies, arguably due to data constraints,
rely on comparisons of the cross-sectional variation in economic performance rather
than on a difference-in-difference methodology. Wei (1993) uses city-level data for
a sample of coastal cities where special policies were introduced in 1984, and docu-
ments that cities hosting SEZ have a significantly higher average growth rate during
the early reform period, while other types of preferential policies do not produce the
same effects.1 Since his sample ends in 1990, when only a small subset of the cities
had been granted the status of SEZ, his identification relies on the cross-sectional
comparison between early reformers – a small and arguably selected group – and
cities that were never granted the SEZ status at the time of his study. Wei’s pioneer
study is extended by De´murger et al. (2002) and Jones et al. (2003), who also doc-
ument differences in growth rates between treated and non-treated cities. Different
from these articles, our study exploits the staggered establishment of SEZ across
cities. This allows us to estimate the treatment effect controlling for time-invarying
heterogeneity (city fixed effects) and time-varying province-level shocks.
Other studies focus on different economic outcomes. Cheng and Kwan (2000)
show that provinces hosting SEZ attract significantly more foreign direct investment
(FDI) than do other provinces. A recent study by Wang (2013) uses a panel of
Chinese cities and finds, using a difference-in-difference approach similar to ours, a
strong positive effects of SEZ on FDI, exports, and the output of foreign enterprises.
The effects on other outcome variables (which do not comprise GDP) are smaller
and less robust. Our findings are complementary to Wang (2013) insofar as we
focus on GDP, a comprehensive measure for the development of the local economy,
while her study focuses on direct intermediate targets of the policy. An important
difference for our analysis is that we distinguish between state-level and province-
level SEZ (see below for a detailed motivation for this choice). Without drawing
such a distinction, the introduction of SEZ yields no statistically significant effect
in our sample. Some studies document the effect of China’s SEZ at the firm level.
Head and Ries (1996) analyze the location decision of international firms in Chinese
cities and find that SEZ have a positive effect that this is amplified by agglomeration
economies. Schminke and Van Biesebroeck (2013) estimate the effect of being located
inside SEZ on firm’s productivity and export behavior. They find that firms in SEZ
1Wei (1993) uses two samples: the first has 434 cities but only a limited time variation from 1988-1990.
The second sample includes fewer cities (74) and covers the period 1980-1990.
4export more, have higher output per worker and higher capital intensity, but no
higher TFP once selection is controlled for.
Zones with special policies are not unique to China (see Akinci and Crittle 2008).
In a recent study on US “Empowerment Zones”, Busso et al. (2013) compare lo-
cations selected for special treatment, such as tax-credits and subsidies for disad-
vantaged neighborhoods, with similar locations that were rejected or treated in a
second round. They conclude that the policy had significantly positive effects on
employment and wages, while the efficiency costs were relatively small.
Our study also relates more generally to a large literature on liberalization and
industrial policy, including specific applications to the Chinese reform process.2 Ro-
drik (2006) argues that government policies creating distortions in favor of more
advanced industries had an important role in the success of Chinese reforms. Dewa-
tripoint and Roland (1995) and Rodrik (2004) argue that, through experimentation,
the state can generate information about the potential of different sectors. Our
findings are broadly consistent with these theses. Finally, our study has some simi-
larity in both the methodology and motivation with Aghion et al. (2008) studying
the effect of industrial policy (the demise of the License Raj) in India. Similar to
our study, they exploit the fact that the reforms were staggered across time and
sectors. However, different from our study, they emphasize the interaction between
the reform and state-level characteristics of the labor market. Moreover, they study
an episode of pure liberalization (delicensing) while China’s industrial policy also
entails proactive policy elements (tax credits, subsidies, etc.).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II provides an overview
of the institutional background of economic reforms in China with special focus on
SEZ. Section III describes the data sources and the sample. Section IV discusses the
empirical strategy and the main results. Section V performs a variety of robustness
checks. Section VI concludes.
II. China’s Economic Reforms and Institutions
Since its establishment in 1949, the People’s Republic of China relied on rigid
economic planning. The State Planning Commission, a division of the State Council,
was in charge of economic development. The two decades preceding Mao’s death
in 1976 were characterized by low and volatile economic growth, and by an intense
social turmoil. The reformist political leadership that won the battle for Mao’s
succession in 1978, led by Deng Xiaoping, faced the desperate need for measures
to reconstruct social cohesion and revitalize the economy. There were, however, no
existing blueprints showing how to proceed. Learning-through-experiment became
then the guiding principle of economic reforms. As Deng put it: “one has to grope
for stepping-stones as he crossed the river”.
The first policy breakthrough happened in rural areas, where agricultural produc-
tion until then had been carried out in collective communes. Under a new production
system which was later called the Household Responsibility System, farmers were
entitled, after fulfilling their procurement quota, to the rest of their agricultural
output. The new system was first implemented in Anhui and Sichuan provinces and
extended to the whole country by the end of 1982. It was a major success. The
national grain harvest increased from 304.8 million tons in 1978 to 407.3 million tons
in 1984.
2See Perkins (1988), Naughton (2007), Brandt and Rawski (2008), and Xu (2011).
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and that industrialization necessitated opening up China to foreign investments.
However, the reformists’ plans to open the economy met the strong resistance of
the conservative fraction of the Communist Party (CCP) central committee. To
the conservative ideologists, renting China’s land to foreign companies and allowing
them to exploit China’s cheap labor would mean selling out China and exposing it
to the influence of western ideologies.
1980-1984
The establishment of SEZ resulted from the compromise between the reformist
and conservative forces. In the year 1980, four cities in the provinces of Fujian
and Guangdong, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen, were granted the status
of SEZ. These are geographically limited pieces of land and usually located in the
suburban areas of cities. The SEZ were given special economic treatment, including
tax deduction and special tariffs for import and export as well as less regulation on
foreign exchange and land use. Foreign firms that resided inside of the SEZ enjoyed
first two years of tax holiday, then three years of a low tax rate of 7.5%, and after
the initial five years a tax rate of 15% (outside of the zones, the tax rate for foreign
firms was 33% and for state-owned firms 55%) (see Wei 1993).
The location of the zones was carefully chosen. First, all were located in cities on
the southeastern coast of China, far away from the political center Beijing. There,
local officials, facing less political resistance from the conservative leaders in the
central committee, had more freedom and flexibility to design and implement inno-
vative policies. Second, the zones were geographically close to Hong Kong, Macau
and Taiwan. Over the past several hundreds of years, the people in Guangdong and
Fujian province had established deep connections with the overseas Chinese through
kinship and trade.
The idea of SEZ was per se no Chinese innovation. China’s SEZ inherited some
essential characteristics of the Export Processing Zones, which had already been
established in over 80 countries by 1980 (Naughton 2007, and Vogel 2011). Like the
Export Processing Zones, the SEZ were designed to circumvent the complex rules
of import and export. China’s SEZ were special in the sense that they also bore the
responsibility of policy innovation and experimentation. They were the laboratories
for the market economy. According to the official document issued by the party
center and State Council, “the four Special Economic Zones would carry on systems
and policies that are different from other places. The Special Economic Zones will
be regulated primarily by the market.” (Vogel 2011: p.399). The local officials of
the zones were implicitly encouraged to be innovative in designing economic policies
and institutions. Many of the policy innovations inside of a zone, including the
establishment of China’s first labor market in Shenzhen, were deemed illegal outside
of it. They were, however, later extended to the rest of the country after proving
successful.
1984-1991
The success of the SEZ was remarkable: between 1980 and 1984 Shenzhen grew
at an annual rate of 54%, and in 1984, the four SEZ alone attracted 26% of China’s
total FDI. In addition, the zones had developed a set of well-functioning markets for
labor, land, capital, transportation and technology (Zeng 2010). The success of the
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of the conservative leaders. In 1984, 14 coastal cities were granted the right to
build Economic and Technological Development Zones (ETDZ). The ETDZ shared
most of the policies and privileges granted earlier to the initial four SEZ. Many
of the 14 cities were old treaty ports that were opened up at the end of the Qing
Dynasty. Even before receiving the special status, these cities, with an established
industrial base and a well educated labor force, were among the most developed
areas in China. According to the official statistics, the 14 coastal cities constituted
21.8% of the national total industrial output in 1985.
1991-2003
During January and February of 1992, Deng made his celebrated tour to southern
China, including stops at the SEZ of Shenzhen and Zhuhai, to mark the end of a pe-
riod of political instability and to restate the commitment of the CCP to the reform
process. Shortly afterwards, a new SEZ called Pudong New Area, was established in
Shanghai. In May, the CCP’s party center issued document No. 4, announcing the
plan to grant the five inland cities along the Yangtze River, nine border cities and
all thirty of the provincial capital the same privileges as the SEZ (Fewsmith 2001).
Following the instruction, 18 state-level ETDZ were approved during 1992-1993 and
17 more during 2000-2002, all located in inland provinces. Another type of zone,
the High-tech Industry Development Zone (HIDZ), was also established during the
same period. The establishment of the HIDZ was an essential part of the ”Torch
Program”, a program carried out by the Ministry of Science and Technology to
guide and facilitate the development of China’s high-tech industries. ETDZ and
HIDZ were granted the same preferential policies and administration status. How-
ever, they emphasized different goals of the development strategy. The main goal of
HIDZ was to help transform domestic research outcomes into profitable high-tech
companies. The HIDZ were located in cities with many universities and research
institutions. In several cases, the HIDZ and ETDZ were located in the same city,
with HIDZ established several years ahead of ETDZ.
2003-present
During the past ten years, the reform of SEZ spread quickly across China. By
the year 2005, the system of state-level development zones comprised 54 ETDZ, 53
HIDZ, 15 Bonded Zones (BZ) and 60 Export Processing Zones (EPZ).3 In the year
2005, the 54 ETDZ contributed 4.49% of the national GDP and 14.93% of national
export (Ministry of Commerce 2006). Establishing a development zone became a
common strategy for the local government to attract FDI and foster local economic
growth. Through shuffling local officials across different regions, the governments
diffused the knowledge and experiences accumulated in the early zones to help de-
velop new SEZ (Xu 2011). Figure 2 shows that by 2010 SEZ had been established
throughout the country.
Besides the state-level zones, a large number of lower-level zones also were estab-
lished during the same period. On the one hand, the preferential policies, given by
the central government to the state-level zones, did not apply to these lower-level
zones. On the other hand, the lower-level zones were not under close monitoring
3BZ were mainly free trade zones. Most of the EPZ were established within existing SEZ. They were
regulated by local customs to assist firms’ import and export.
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ment and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Land and Resources, the Ministry of
Construction, and the Ministry of Commerce together issued Document No. 2343
to request a thorough investigation into development zones regarding the violation
of the land-use plan. Before the investigation, there were a total number of 6866
development zones of all levels (WEFore 2010). By the end of 2006 when the in-
vestigation came to an end, only 1568 zones survived and gained official approval
from the state (see State Development and Reform Commission (2006) for the list of
zones). A large number of the development zones were abolished following the inves-
tigation, including all zones at a lower than province-level and several province-level
zones. After 2006, there existed only two levels of development zones – state-level
and province-level. Starting from 2010, a number of province-level zones were pro-
moted to state-level conditional on passing certain standards, including performance
in economic growth, production safety and environmental protection. By the end of
2010, the number of state-level ETDZ had increased from 54 to 88.
A. Experimentation and Convergence in the Policies of the Zones
During the early stage of the development of SEZ, the policies were intended
not only to attract FDI but also to foster institutional innovation. Therefore, ex-
cept for tax deduction, protection of private property and land-use policies, local
governments were given significant freedom to design new institutions. Successful
innovations were retained and extended to later waves of development zones (see
Yeung et al. (2009)). Gradually, the institutional structure of the SEZ became
stable. Policy treatment became uniform across all state-level ETDZs and HIDZs.
At present, the preferential policy treatment for the state-level ETDZ and HIDZ
includes: 1) tax and customs duty deduction, 2) discounted land-use price, 3) no
regulation on labor contracts and 4) special treatment on bank loans.
B. Different Types of the State-level Development Zones
There are five types of state-level development zones: comprehensive SEZ (a label
we use to distinguish the early created special zones from the broad notion of SEZ),
Economic and Technological Development Zone (ETDZ), High-tech and Industrial
Development Zone (HIDZ), Bonded Zones (BZ), Export Processing Zone (EPZ) and
Border Economic Cooperation Zones (BECZ). They all share the same preferential
treatment in terms of tax deduction, custom duty deduction, reduced land-use price,
flexibility in signing labor contract and financing. But the types of zones differ along
several dimensions. First, they are administered by different authorities. Among
them, the comprehensive SEZ, ETDZ and HIDZ are directed by State Council (HIDZ
is co-directed by the Ministry of Science and Technology). BZ and EPZ are directed
by customs. BECZ were directed by the State Council until 2007, and are now under
the control of the Ministry of Commerce.
Second, the zones reflect different aspects of the development plan. The compre-
hensive SEZ, located in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Xiamen, Shantou, Hainan, Shanghai and
Tianjin, are the largest in scale and enjoy the most autonomy among the zones.
They are expected to play an active role in defining the frontier of economic and so-
cial development. The ETDZ share similar policies and development goals with the
comprehensive SEZ, such as attracting FDI and boosting export, only on a smaller
scale. Although the institutional innovation was more active and frequent at the
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encouraged to design and experiment with new institutions and policies. The HIDZ,
which are co-directed by the Ministry of Science and Technology, focus on fostering
the domestic high-tech industries. The BZ are typical free trade zones: small and
closed areas where import and export can take place at a faster speed. They are all
located in coastal port cities or border cities, which also helps to develop the logistics
industry. The function of EPZ is ”export processing”, which means to import raw
materials from abroad, process them and export the final goods without entering
the real territory of China. Many of the EPZ are established inside of the ETDZ
and HIDZ. The BECZ intend to take advantage of the location of the border cities
to foster trade with other countries.
C. The State-level and Province-Level Zones
State-level and province-level development zones co-existed during the 30-year
history of the economic reform. In some cities, province-level development zones
were established before the state-level zones. Despite some commonalities, there
are fundamental differences between state-level and province-level SEZ suggesting
that their effects might be highly diverse. First, province-level zones include areas
where the special status meant de facto almost nothing. This causes a rampant
measurement error problem that is much less severe for state-level zones.
Second, the preferential economic policies granted to the province-level zones have
been heavily constrained by the administrative and legislative power of the provincial
government. The state council explicitly requested that ”the policies given to the
province-level development zones should not be comparable to those given to the
state-level ones”, in order to prevent excessive competition between the zones and
the waste of land resources (State Administration of Taxation 2004). In reality, the
policy treatment of the state-level zones normally included both the policies usually
accorded to provincial zones and farther-reaching measures granted under the direct
control of the central government.
Another difference is that in many cases province-level zones targeted specific in-
dustries (often catering to local interest groups). In contrast, the most important
policies of the state-level zones, such as tax and custom duty deduction, were gen-
erally industry-blind. If there are exceptions to this principle, they reflect a general
strategy of the government (such as the promotion of the development of particular
industries nationwide) rather than the influence of local interests: for instance, in
recent years state-level zones have favored high-tech industries.
In Table 1, we list the number of state-level and province-level development zones
and their average share of industrial output in three coastal provinces hosting a
large share of SEZ. The data are from WEFore (2010) for the year 2009. All three
provinces have a larger number of province-level than of state-level zones. However,
the state-level zones account for a far larger share to industrial output. We will
show that, empirically, state- and province-level zones have very different effects on
economic development at the city level.
III. Data
In this section, we describe the variables we use in the empirical analysis. Our
data come from two main sources. First, the official statistics from the National
Statistics Bureau of China (NSB) including GDP, electricity consumption, popula-
tion, education, government spending, and land area. We also use the light intensity
9data from weather satellites as a proxy for GDP. More detailed information about
our data sources is provided in the online appendix.
The main unit of analysis is the core urban area of a prefecture-level city, an
administrative division ranking below a province and above a county in China’s
administrative structure. A prefecture-level city comprises a core urban area (corre-
sponding to the standard notion of city area) and a large surrounding area that may
include rural areas, other smaller cities, towns and villages. Since SEZ are located in
core urban areas, and the NSB reports separate statistics for the core and periphery
of each prefecture-level city, we focus on the urban core of prefecture-level cities,
unless we state otherwise. A more detailed discussion and motivation of this choice
of the unit of analysis is deferred to the online appendix. For simplicity, henceforth,
we refer to the the core urban area of a prefecture-level city as a city and to the
whole prefecture-level city area as a prefecture.4
A. Main Variables
We denote by i the city, by p the province, and by t the year.
Dependent Variables
• logGDPipt is the logarithm of nominal GDP at the city level from the China City
Statistical Yearbooks.
• log GDPiptLipt is the logarithm of nominal GDP per capita at the city level. The
population Lipt is taken from the China City Statistical Yearbooks.
• logElectricityipt is the electricity consumption at the city level from the China
City Statistical Yearbooks (available for the same set of cities as GDP). It measures
the use of electricity for household consumption and industrial production and is
a proxy for the level of economic activity.
• logLightipt is the average light intensity at the city level, another proxy for eco-
nomic activity. In the data provided by the National Geographical Data Center,
light intensity is measured on each square km (pixel) on a discrete scale from 0-63.
We use digital maps of Chinese cities to aggregate the light intensity of the pixels
to administrative units.
• log KiptLipt is the logarithm of physical capital per capita. The physical capital stock
Kipt is constructed with the perpetual inventory method. To construct the phys-
ical capital stock, we take the data on new investment for the period 1988-2010
from the China City Statistical Yearbooks, and assume an annual depreciation
rate of 8%. For some cities, we collect the new investment data from New China
in 60 Year Provincial Statistical Collection for the earlier period 1978-1987. The
province-specific series of investment deflator is obtained from New China in 60
Years Statistical Collection. The population Lipt is taken from the China City
Statistical Yearbooks.
• log hipt is the logarithm of average human capital, constructed using average edu-
cational attainment of population over the age of 6. The educational attainment
data comes from China Population Census.
4In the China City Statistical Yearbooks, the prefecture is called ”di ji shi” and the city is called ”shi
qu”.
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• logAipt is the logarithm of TFP, constructed as a standard Solow residual.
Explanatory Variables
Our main explanatory variables are indicators for the presence of a SEZ. More
precisely, for each of the different types of SEZ we construct a dummy, I Reformit,
which switches on (i.e., takes the unit value) in the year after the establishment of a
zone and retains the unit value in all following years. Formally, we define the reform
indicator based on the establishment of a zone as
I Reformit =
{
1 if ReformY eari < t
0 otherwise.
,
where ReformY eari is the year in which a zone was established in city i and t
is the current year. Note that for cities that never host a zone I Reformit = 0 for
all t. We also construct separate dummies for each lag from the reform year, as
discussed in more detail in the empirical sections.
Primary Control Variables
We use two main control variables from the China City Statistical Yearbooks. First,
the geographic size of the city, to which we refer as land area measured in square
kilometers. This variable is available at both the city and prefecture level, and varies
over time reflecting changes in the legal city boundaries during the reform period.
The second control variable is population, which again we observe for each city and
prefecture. Although population is partly endogenous to the establishment of a SEZ,
we find it useful to filter out the part of the SEZ’s effect on GDP that originates from
mere population changes. In Section V we add to the list of control variables the
expenditure of the local government, also from the China City Statistical Yearbooks.
Fixed Effects
We include in all regressions two sets of dummies in order to control for unobserved
heterogeneity. Time-invariant city characteristics are absorbed by city fixed effects.
Time-varying heterogeneity at the province-level is absorbed by province×time fixed
effects. In some regressions we also include city-specific linear time trends.
B. Price Data
The China City Statistical Yearbooks published by the National Bureau of Statis-
tics report nominal GDP for the period 1988-2010. We rely on this source because
it provides a consistent measurement of GDP across cities and years. Since Chinese
price data are regarded as somewhat unreliable (see, for example, Young 2003), we
opt to use nominal data. Time invariant differences in price level across cities and
time varying inflation differences across provinces are absorbed, respectively, by city
and province×time fixed effects. This approach would be problematic if inflation
rates differed significantly across cities within each province. The main concern
is that the SEZ treatment might increase systematically local inflation. We check
if there are differences in inflation rates between treated and non-treated cities in
those years for which real GDP data are available from the NBS. More precisely,
we compute an implicit city-level deflator using the data on nominal and real GDP,
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and compare it between cities with and without a SEZ. We find that, within each
province, cities with a SEZ did not have higher inflation.5 As an alternative strategy
that avoids relying on prices altogether, we use electricity consumption (in GWh)
and light intensity as proxies for the level of economic activity.
C. Sample
The sample period is 1988-2010 for the China City Statistical Yearbooks and 1992-
2010 for the light data. For this period, we have a consistent definition of city bor-
ders, and information on the main variables of interest.6 We focus on 276 cities,
excluding from our analysis the four cities in which comprehensive SEZ were intro-
duced before 1988, as well as Hainan, where the entire province received the status
of SEZ in 1988. Furthermore, we exclude Tibet, where we have data for only one
city, and the province-level municipalities, including Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai
and Tianjin, because our set of province-time fixed effect would absorb all variation
in GDP.
IV. Empirical Strategy and Results
In this section, we discuss the econometric strategy and the main results. We use
a difference-in-difference estimator exploiting the variation in economic policy across
cities and years following the establishment of SEZ. The main dependent variable
is GDP at the city level, which we measure in three alternative ways: first, from
official statistics (this section), then using light intensity and electricity consumption
as proxies of the level of economic activity (section V).
Table 2 shows the summary statistics of our dependent variables and of the main
control variables. We have over 5100 observations for GDP from an unbalanced
panel of 276 cities from 1988 to 2010. Our policy variable, the establishment of
SEZ, is illustrated in Figure 1. This figure shows the time evolution of the shares
of cities hosting the different types of zones in the balanced sample. The two most
important types of zones are HIDZ and ETDZ with shares reaching 31% and 24%
in 2010, respectively. Two types of zones existed before the start of our sample:
the comprehensive SEZ, established in 1980, and a few early ETDZ, established
in 1984. ETDZ and HIDZ are altogether the most frequent zone types. We also
consider Export Processing Zones (EPZ) and other less frequent types of zones (e.g.,
BZ and BECZ), introduced in cities that already hosted either ETDZ or HIDZ. We
control for province-level zones, but we do not combine these with our state-level
SEZ because these are more limited in scope and highly heterogeneous, as discussed
above.
5A real GDP index of prefecture level city centers is available from the NBS for the period 2002-2010.
For this period, cities with a SEZ had an average yearly inflation rate (as implied by the implicit deflator
constructed from nominal and real GDP series) of 3.3%. Cities without a SEZ had an average yearly
inflation rate of 4.0%. This suggests that reformer cities, if anything, have a lower inflation rate, although
the difference is not statistically significant. The data on real GDP of the prefecture (instead of the city)
dates back until 1996. When using this longer time series, we find that prefectures with a SEZ had an average
yearly inflation rate of 1.8%, while prefectures without a SEZ had an average of 2.3%. The difference is
again not statistically significant.
6During the period of economic reforms, there was also a reform of the administrative levels and borders
of cities. Our data from the National Bureau of Statistics provide a consistent definition across cities and
time.
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A. Baseline Specification
Our baseline specification is a city-level panel regression whose dependent variable
is the log of GDP. The main explanatory variables are reform indicators switching
on in the year after part of a city’s territory is granted the status of SEZ.7 Note
that cities may have multiple zones of different types. Since our goal is to assess
the effect of different types of zones, in some specifications we allow each city to
be subject to multiple treatments. All regressions control for city fixed effects and
province-time interaction dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the city-level.
More formally, we run regressions of the form
(1) yipt = φi + γpt + α I Reformit +Xitβ + εit,
where yipt is log nominal GDP, φi is a city fixed effect, γtp is a province-time fixed
effect and I Reformit is an indicator switching on, for each city, in the year after
a SEZ is established. Xit is a vector of time-varying controls including log land
area and log population. εit is a normal error term. City fixed effects absorb time-
invariant heterogeneity in city characteristics like initial development or geographical
location. Thus, the effects of reforms are identified across city-time within each
province. Province-time fixed effects control for time varying province-specific shocks
that can play a confounding role. In particular, they absorb cross-province inflation
differentials.
The econometric specification in (1) restricts the treatment effect to a shift in the
after-reform GDP level path, namely, in reformed cities the GDP level (or trend)
is allowed to shift whenever the reform indicator switches on. This specification is
clearly restrictive. One might expect reforms to have cumulative effects on devel-
opment, such as temporary or even permanent changes in growth rates. For this
reason, we explore below more flexible econometric specifications allowing for trend
breaks and distributed lags.
We start our analysis by aggregating all state-level reforms into a single indicator
switching on after a city is granted, for the first time, the status of any state-level
SEZ. We construct a similar single dummy for province-level reforms. The estimated
coefficients are shown in Table 3. In column (1), we include no additional control
variable except for the fixed effects. The coefficient of the ”post-reform indicator
for any state-level reform” is positive and highly significant. Becoming the host of
a SEZ increases the average GDP level of the treated city by 19% in post-reform
years. In contrast, the effect of province-level reforms is small and insignificant. In
column (2) we control for the log of the city center area. This variable controls for
changes in city borders, which are relatively frequent in China and would change
GDP mechanically, possibly at the time of the introduction of a SEZ. The size of a
city’s land area has, as expected, a positive effect on GDP. Its inclusion reduces the
treatment effect, but this remains large (14.7%) and highly significant. In column (3)
we add the log population of the city center as a further control. Population has, as
expected, a positive coefficient, and its inclusion causes land area to lose explanatory
power. The treatment effect falls slightly but remains large (12.7%) and highly
significant. Finally, in column (4) we use GDP per capita as our outcome variable.
The estimated reform effect is now 11.7%, highly significant. In columns (5)–(8)
we repeat the analysis for the sub-sample of inland provinces. In this sub-sample,
7Including the year of the reform in the dummy does not alter the baseline results significantly.
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cities were granted the status of SEZ on the basis of administrative criteria, such as
being a provincial capital.8 This is an interesting sub-sample since it involves less
selection, as discussed above. To mitigate selection concerns even further, we exclude
from the inland sub-sample cities that were granted the status of SEZ in spite of not
being provincial capitals. Thus, the restricted inland sample only contains provincial
capitals (treatment group) and cities that were never granted the SEZ status (control
group). Columns (5)–(8) in Table 3 show that the results are largely robust to this
sample restriction.9 The coefficient of interest is positive and significant, and even
larger than in the total sample.
B. Pre-reform Trends
A concern with the results of Table 3 is that cities hosting SEZ might already have
been on a higher-growth trajectory – or might even have been selected precisely
because of their promise of success. The focus on inland capitals alleviates such
concerns. However, the year in which capitals were assigned to the treatment group
may not be random. Moreover, provincial capitals may be a special group per se.
We address this point through two strategies. First, we investigate whether the
performance of treated cities was different from that of other cities in the same
province in the years shortly pre-dating the reform. Table 4 is the analogue of Table
3, reporting the results of regressions where we add four pre-reform indicators taking
on the unit value, respectively, in the year of reform and one, two and three years
before the reform.10 If cities were granted the status of SEZ due to their promising
pre-reform trends, these coefficients ought to be positive and significant. In contrast,
we find the estimated coefficient of the pre-reform dummies to be insignificant, and
often negative. The treatment effect instead continues to be positive and significant,
except in columns (7) and (8), where it turns marginally insignificant. It is useful to
note that the point estimates in the restricted sample (including those that are not
statistically significant) are similar to those in the full sample, although estimated
less precisely. In summary, the results of Table 4 are reassuring, and suggest that
there were no important differences in pre-reform economic performance between
treated cities and the control group.11
Second, we consider a more flexible specification allowing treated cities to have
different time trends from the non-reformers. This addresses the potential worry
that in our baseline specification the positive effect of SEZ might arise spuriously
due to the omission of pre-existing trends. The new specification allows the GDP
8In the sub-sample of inland cities, 44 cities were granted SEZ status. Of these, 18 were provincial
capitals.
9Arguably, inland capitals is per se a special group. Since the selection of treated cities was based on
an administrative criterion (rather than on unknown, possible heterogenous criteria), we can control for
features making capital cities different from the control group, such as infrastructure and education, and
allow the treatment effect to depend interactively on such features. In a regression not reported, available
upon request, we find that including these interactions does not alter significantly the main treatment effect
which remains in all cases highly significant. The only significant interaction effect is that with the number
of universities, whose sign is positive.
10We also explored longer lags. There is evidence of some marginally significant effects at the five-year
lag. However, lags longer than three years are identified out of a significantly smaller set of reforming cities
(since many cities were granted the SEZ status in the early 1990’s, and our sample only starts in 1988). For
instance, in the full sample the first three lags are identified out of 73 to 75 cities, while the fifth lag would
only be identified out of 27 cities. In the restricted sample, the first three lags are identified out of 18 cities,
whereas the fifth lag is only identified out of 3 cities.
11Note also that the earliest zones (”comprehensive SEZ”) introduced before 1989, likely the most selected
group, are either excluded or exhibit no time-variation in the policy indicators in our sample period. Thus,
they play no role in the identification of the treatment effect.
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of cities that host, at some point, a SEZ to have a linear time trend that differs
from the control group’s already before the reform. In some specifications, we even
allow this trend to undergo a structural break at the time when the reform indicator
switches on. More formally, we consider the following specification:
yipt = φi + γtp + α1I Reformit + α2 [(t− 1987)× I Reformeri](2)
+α3 [max {0, (t−ReformY eari)× I Reformit}] +Xitβ + εit,
where, as above, I Reformit is an indicator switching on in the first year after the
reform. Moreover,
• I Reformeri is a dummy identifying cities that were reformed at any time. t ≥
1988 denotes the year of the observation. Therefore, α2 captures the steepness of
a linear trend specific to reformers, i.e., how many percentage points the growth
rate differs between reformers and non-reformers.
• ReformY eari is the year in which the first SEZ was introduced in city i (if
a city never became a SEZ, then we let ReformY eari = 0). The interaction
[(t−ReformY eari)× I Reformit] allows a differential trend (i.e., a trend break)
starting as of the introduction of the first SEZ. The coefficient α3 measures the
steepness of such a trend break.
• α1 captures a level shift as in the baseline specification of equation (1).
The results for the full and restricted (inland) samples are shown in Table 5,
columns (1)-(4) and (5)-(8), respectively. We build here on the specification of
columns (3) and (7) in Table 3, including all control variables (whose estimated
coefficients are not reported, for simplicity). The results are robust to the other
specifications presented in Table 3. Columns (1) and (5) of Table 5 simply repro-
duce for convenience columns (3) and (7) in Table 3, respectively. In the regressions
of columns (2) and (6) we add a linear trend specific to reformers. The estimated
coefficient αˆ2 (”time trend of reformers (state-level)”) is statistically significant in
both the full and the restricted sample. Interestingly, the coefficient αˆ1 continues
to be highly significant in the full sample, although much of the effect is now ab-
sorbed by the trend. However, it becomes marginally insignificant in the restricted
sample. The trend in columns (2) and (6) does not distinguish pre- and post-reform
periods. Thus, in columns (3) and (7) we allow a structural break in the trend of
reformed cities, by including max {0, (t−ReformY eari)× I Reformit} in the re-
gression. Interestingly, the estimated coefficient αˆ1 remains almost unchanged in the
full sample and increases slightly in the restricted sample. Moreover, the estimated
coefficient of the pre-reform trend, αˆ2, is small and only marginally significant in
the full sample, while it is insignificant in the inland sample. The post-reform trend,
αˆ3, is insignificant in both samples. Altogether, the statistical specification studied
so far suggests that the baseline model with a GDP level shift performs better than
one allowing for a trend break implying a permanent GDP divergence between the
treatment and control groups.
The specification of columns (2)–(3) and (6)–(7) – allowing for permanently di-
verging paths – may be too extreme. We consider, then, an alternative specification
allowing SEZ to have a non-linear effect of the SEZ relative to the pre-reform trend.
To avoid an overparameterization, we omit the level shift, and we estimate the
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following alternative econometric specification:12
yipt = φi + γtp + α2 [(t− 1987)× I Reformeri](3)
+α3 [max {0, (t−ReformY eari)× I Reformit}]
+α4 [max {0, (t−ReformY eari)× I Reformit}]2 +Xitβ + εit.
The regression results from this specification are provided in columns (4) and (8).
In both cases, we find that αˆ3 > 0 and αˆ4 < 0, implying that the SEZ are associated
with an acceleration of growth in the immediate post-reform years, but that the
acceleration dies off in subsequent years. The coefficients are both individually and
jointly statistically significant. Interestingly, in the full sample there continues to
be some evidence of a positive pre-reform differential trend for reformers. In con-
trast, in the restricted sample of inner cities we find no such evidence (the estimated
coefficients αˆ2 turns negative and totally insignificant). This suggests that the gov-
ernment might have picked winners in the full sample, but not in the restricted
inland sample. In summary, this specification suggests that the effect of SEZ is a
significant gradual increase in the GDP level, rather than a permanent increase in
growth (i.e., a linear trend break of the treated cities after reforms).13
C. Lagged Effects of SEZ
Motivated by the findings in the previous section, we now perform a non-parametric
analysis of the effects of the reform with the aid of a model that imposes no func-
tional form restrictions on post- (and pre-) reform effects. All effects are captured
by separate lag- or lead-specific dummies. More formally, we run the following
regression:
yipt = φi + γt,p +
JF∑
n=−JB
αnI
n
it{(t−Reformyeari) = n}+Xitβ + εit,
where positive values of t − Reformyeari measure how many years before year t
city i became the host of a SEZ. Negative values measure how many years ahead
of t city i will be reformed. Note that this specification allows us to identify some
of the lagged effects out of reforms that took place before 1988. For instance a city
that hosted its first SEZ in 1986 will have variation for all leads ranging from 2 to
24 years. In our baseline specification, instead, such a city would display no within
variation, and the reform indicator would be collinear with the city fixed effect. In
our sample, the maximum number of post-reform leads, JF , is 26, corresponding to
a single city which hosted its first SEZ in 1984. We construct these indicators also
for the year of reform and the three years prior to the reform (i.e. JB = 3), so we
can test whether reforming cities already had a significantly different performance
prior to the establishment of the first zone.14 The omitted categories (for which
12It would be possible to include also the term α1I Reformit to this specification. However, it is very
difficult to identify separately all the effects in such a highly parametrized model. Therefore, we omit this
term, and regard the current specification as a non-nested alternative to equation (2).
13Clearly, the quadratic model is not a correct specification itself, since it would imply a negative long-run
effect of SEZ. Given the short sample, the data only capture the increasing part of the quadratic relation.
See the next section for a more general specification.
14For the same reasons described in the discussion of Table 4, we do not include more pre-reform indicators.
When we include also indicators for four and five years prior to the reform, these indicators are marginally
significant, but identified by only 27 observations.
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all indicators are zero) are never-reforming cities and cities more than three years
before the reform. The controls include land area, population, and the usual set of
fixed effects.
The results are displayed in Figure 3, showing the lead and lagged effects of the
treatment n years past the reform (for instance, n=10 measures the effect ten years
past the introduction of a SEZ). This specification confirms the results of the previ-
ous section. In particular, there is a break in the GDP path a year after the reform,
followed by a temporarily higher growth rate that levels off after about ten years.
The size of the effects are comparable to those in the previous section.15 There is
only some marginal, statistically insignificant evidence of a higher GDP growth in
the three years before the reform, indicating some minor positive selection. Note
that the standard errors increase after nineteen years after the establishment of the
zone (corresponding to the vertical line added to each figure). This is due to a sig-
nificant drop in the number of observations, since many cities were reformed in 1991
and 1992.16
We estimate the same regression for the restricted sample of inland provinces (ex-
cluding cities which had a reform but are not provincial capitals), see Figure 4. The
qualitative pattern and the point estimates are similar, although the estimation is
less precise, and only the effects 9-12 years after the reform are statistically dif-
ferent from zero.17 In section V.G, we show that if residuals are clustered at the
province×years of reform (instead of city) level, the effects 7-18 years are statistically
significant in the inland sample.
D. Different Types of SEZ
In this section, we attempt to disentangle the effects of the different types of SEZ
which had distinct policies. To this aim, we create separate post-reform indicators
for each of the three most important (and most common) SEZ: ETDZ, HIDZ and
EPZ. In addition, we create a single dummy for other types of state-level SEZ. Table
6 has the same structure as Table 3 but replaces the indicator for ”any” state-level
zone with the four separate indicators for each type of state-level SEZ. ETDZ and
HIDZ appear to have a large effect. In the full sample, the effects of these two
types of zones are quantitatively similar to those of the first zone in Table 3. In the
inland sample, there are two deviations. First, the point estimate of ETDZ remains
positive but becomes insignificant when the dependent variable is GDP per capita.
Second, the OtherTypes have in two cases a higher estimate than ETDZ and HIDZ,
although these results are driven by very few observations.18 EPZ are insignificant
throughout, although the coefficient is positive in seven out of eight cases. Overall,
the disaggregation highlights the relative importance of the ETDZ and HIDZ, which
are the two largest and most comprehensive types of zones in our sample, as well as
those emphasizing most explicitly technology development aspects.
The regressions with simple post-reform indicators for the different types of zones
is restrictive in the sense that it assumes a jump in the GDP level after the reform.
15The average over the yearly estimates (weighted with the number of observations identifying each
estimate) of all post-reform indicators is 17.1%, which is even somewhat higher than the result in the simple
regression in Table 4.
16When the cities reformed in 1991 and 1992 reach the year 2010, the subsequent number of cities that
identify the individual coefficients drops from 54 to 9. The vertical dashed line in the figure marks this drop.
17The reforms in the inland provinces started almost a decade later than in the coastal provinces. The
post-reform effects are therefore estimated for a shorter period and based on fewer observations.
1814 cities have a zone type other than ETDZ, HIDZ, or EPZ, but in 11 of these the zone this is in
conjunction with an ETDZ or HIDZ.
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Since we have seen that the effects of ”any” zone build up gradually during about ten
years and then level off, we investigate whether the same pattern holds true for the
individual types of zones. Since the pre- and post-reform effects of different types of
zones often overlap (treated cities often had multiple zones of different kinds), the
approach in section IV.C is quite demanding. Nevertheless, the resulting picture
is reasonably clear. Figure A1, which can be found in the online appendix, plots
the coefficients of the different types of zones (estimated in the same regression)
over the years since reform. The first panel shows that the pattern for ETDZ looks
remarkably similar to that of Figure 3 (first zone reformed). The second panel
shows that HIDZ also display a concave pattern, although the effect appears to
decline after lag 10.19 EPZ and OtherTypes show a more mixed picture (the two
lower panels in Figure A1).20 The standard errors are very large and the effects
typically are imprecisely estimated and statistically insignificant. In summary, most
development effects appear to stem from ETDZ and HIDZ.
E. Decomposing the Effects of the SEZ
In the previous sections, we document that the establishment of SEZ has a positive
effect on GDP at the city level. In this section, we investigate the channel through
which the zones promote growth. To this aim, we decompose GDP per capita into
the following input factors: physical capital per capita, human capital and TFP. We
then estimate how the establishment of a SEZ affects each of the three components.
Following Hall and Jones (1999) and Caselli (2005), we perform a level-decomposition
exercise based on the standard Cobb-Douglas production function Y = AKα(hL)1−α.
More formally,
log
Yipt
Lipt
= logAipt + α log
Kipt
Lipt
(4)
+(1− α) log hipt
where A denotes total factor productivity, KL the physical capital per capita, and h
the human capital. We use the local population size to proxy the size of labor force
and use the average educational attainment of the population to proxy the human
capital. The details can be found in the online appendix.
In Table 7, we display the results of baseline difference-in-difference regressions
analogous to those performed in section IV.A, where each of the components of the
decomposition equation 4 is used sequentially as the dependent variable. Column (1)
shows that the establishment of a SEZ has a significantly positive effect on GDP per
capita. Becoming the host of a state-level SEZ is associated with a 13.8% increase
in the city’s GDP per capita relative to non-reformed cities in the same province.
When restricting the sample to inland cities, we find the effect on per capita GDP to
be 13.1% and also highly significant, as shown in column (5). The estimated effect
on the capital-labor ratio is displayed in column (2) and column (6). Column (2)
suggests that becoming a host of a state-level SEZ increases the physical capital per
capita of that city in the full sample by 14.8%. The effect on the capital labor ratio
19There is a sharp (statistically insignificant) drop in the last lag (19). This may be due to the changing
sample size, as the number of cities identifying this last coefficient drops discontinuously by more than half
in this period.
20The stark drop in OtherTypes is identified by only one observation. EPZ were established after 2000 and
often inside an existing zone. Furthermore, the EPZ may have gained importance after the WTO accession
in 2001, which could explain their upward trend (though insignificant).
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is more prominent in the inland sub-sample, as shown in column (6) – the point
estimate is 24.4% and highly significant. The estimated effect on TFP in the full
sample is 8.3% and highly significant. On the contrary, the SEZ seems to have a
smaller (4.4%) and insignificant effect on TFP in the inland sample (column (8)).
The SEZ does not have a significant effect on human capital in either of the two
samples (column (3) and (7)).
Taking these results at face value suggests that the establishment of SEZ has a
major positive effect on investments and leads to capital deepening. The capital
deepening effect is more prominent in the inland sample while the full sample shows
a more balanced picture of development, where both the capital-labor ratio and
TFP experience significant increases after the establishment of a state-level zone.21
There is no selective migration effect, i.e., the SEZ do not seem to attract better
educated workers.22
One important caveat here is that the quality of the data on human capital is low.
The only data available at the city-level for education attainment are from the popu-
lation census, which are ten years apart from each other. During our sample period,
three population census took place, in the years 1990, 2000 and 2010. Between the
census years, we must resort to an interpolation. This reduces the accuracy of our
measures of human capital and TFP.
The results on human capital are somewhat different if one evaluates the effects
of SEZ by using only the three years for which direct observations of the education
attainment are available from the census data. Rather than aggregating the existing
information to obtain an estimate of the average years of schooling, we study the
effect of SEZ on the share of each educational attainment level for which data are
available. This yields a better sense of the impact of the policy on the distribution
of human capital in the population. The results are shown in Table 8. Columns (1)
and (2) suggest that after changing to SEZ status, the average years of schooling in
the city increases by 0.17 years in the full sample and 0.23 years in the restricted
(inland) sample.23 Columns (3) and (4) show that establishing a SEZ has no impact
on the share of the population with a low educational attainment (elementary degree
or less). Second, SEZ appear to decrease significantly the share of the population
with junior and senior high school degrees (columns 5-6). Finally, the share of
college graduates in the whole population increases significantly by 3.1% and 3.8%,
respectively, in the full and inland sample (columns 7 and 8). In summary, the main
finding is that the establishment of SEZ is associated with an increase in the share of
college graduates, at the expense of the share with intermediate education.24 This
may be due either to selective immigration (i.e., cities with a SEZ attracting more
21However, as argued in Klenow and Rodrigez-Clare (1997) and others, the increased capital-labor ratio
should be attributed to increased TFP.
22Note that our specification seeks to identify differential improvements in TFP in cities with SEZ com-
pared to cities without SEZ. Other studies that investigate the differential effect of SEZ include Schminke
and Van Biesebroeck (2013) and Wang (2013). Schminke and Van Biesebroeck (2013) find that after con-
trolling for selection bias, the firms that are located in the zones do not achieve significantly higher TFP
than firms outside of the zones. Wang (2013) finds an effect of SEZ on TFP growth after a lag of six years.
It should be noted that TFP on average may still be increasing even if there is no differential effect for
SEZ. For example, Brandt and Zhu (2010) found that increases in TFP in non-state non-agricultural firms
contributed significantly to growth.
23Ideally, we would want to compute the educational attainment of the working population (age 25-64).
Unfortunately, we are unable to do so because the population census only reports educational attainment
for the population over the age of 6.
24In an alternative specification, we bundle senior high school together with college graduates while leaving
junior high school graduates as the middle level category and find a similar result: the share of junior high
school decreases significantly and the share of senior high school and college graduate increases significantly.
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highly educated immigrants) or to stronger incentives for locals to obtain higher
education.
Figures 5, 6, and 7 display the reform effect on GDP per capita, physical capital
per capita and TFP over time. The specification employed here is the analogue to
that of Figure 3. The pattern for GDP per capita in Figure 5 is very similar to
that of GDP in Figure 3. The path of GDP per capita shows a structural break one
year after the reform. GDP per capita grows at a temporarily higher rate for about
10 years and remains at a permanently higher level afterwards. We see a similar
concave post-reform path for physical capital per capita in Figure 6. The path of
physical capital per capita also breaks one year after the reform and only becomes
statistically significant 5 years after the reform, presumably because it takes time
to build up the physical capital. After 19 years, as observed before, the effects are
estimated very imprecisely. The path for TFP also features a break one year after
the reform takes place and the break becomes significant 6 years after reform. The
effect on TFP becomes insignificant 16 years after the reform (see Figure 7).
V. Robustness
In this section we perform robustness analysis. First, we test whether there is
evidence of negative or positive spillovers to neighboring locations. Second, we
repeat the baseline regressions using alternative proxies for GDP. Third, we test the
robustness of the results to the inclusion of additional control variables and years.
Fourth, we perform a variety of placebo exercises. Finally, we consider alternative
clustering strategies.
A. Local Spillovers
We have focused so far on the main urban center (labelled as the ”city”) of each
prefecture which is the area where all state-level SEZ in our sample were established.
Recall that the urban center is a subset of the prefecture, that also include a large
peripheral area comprising smaller cities, towns, villages and rural areas. In this
section, we investigate the existence of local spillovers by studying whether the
policy has any effect on the area surrounding the main urban center. To this aim,
we re-run our baseline regressions of section IV.A using as the dependent variables,
first, the GDP of the entire prefecture (Panel A of Table 9); and then the GDP of
the prefecture’s periphery, i.e., the whole prefecture excluding the city (Panel B of
Table 9).25 Panel A shows that the effects at the prefecture level are of comparable
magnitude to those obtained for the city only. Panel B shows that the results hold
up when we consider only the periphery of the prefecture.26
The results of this section suggest that the positive effects of the SEZ did not
come at the expenses of surrounding areas. Rather, it looks as if the SEZ brought
positive spillovers to the periphery of the prefecture of which the host city is part.
However, our analysis cannot rule out negative spillovers across prefectures.
25On average, the GDP of the prefecture (including the city) is about twice as large as that of the city
only. The size of the population of the prefecture is about four times as large as that of the city, and the
size of the land area is about eight times as large.
26Land area and population are adjusted accordingly. There is a small drop in the number of observations,
since in some cases the city coincides with the prefecture, and thus there is no periphery.
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B. Satellite light as an Alternative Measure of GDP
Chinese price-level data are generally regarded as problematic, especially at the lo-
cal level. Our empirical methodology has the advantage of not relying on any price
deflator. Differences in price levels are filtered out by city fixed effects, whereas
province-time fixed effects filter out cross-province inflation differentials. Yet, one
might worry that cities within each province might have experienced different infla-
tion rates. In particular, our estimated treatment effect would be biased upwards
if the establishment of a SEZ systematically brought about higher inflation. As
discussed above, the fact that the existing price data do not suggest that the estab-
lishment of a SEZ is associated with higher inflation is reassuring in this respect.
However, one might also worry that the local authorities could over-report the nomi-
nal GDP of treated cities, in order to meet the expectation of the central government
regarding the performance of SEZ.
To address these issues, in this section we use light intensity measured by weather
satellites as an alternative proxy for GDP. A number of recent papers have argued
that light intensity at night measured by weather satellites can be used as a proxy for
GDP.27 Most economic activities such as production, transport, and consumption
produce light as a by-product. Therefore, light intensity is positively correlated with
the intensity of local economic activities. We calculate the average light intensity
within the geographical boundaries of cities and use this as a proxy for economic
activity. In column (1) of Table 10 we re-run our baseline regression with the log-
arithm of the average light intensity as the dependent variable.28 Unfortunately,
light intensity is only available since 1992, and only one-third of the (first) SEZ
were established after that year. Moreover, even for later reformers we lose annual
observations that would be useful for a precise estimation of the within-city effect
of SEZ establishment. The loss of precision is confirmed by the observation that if
we run the baseline regression of section IV with GDP as the dependent variable for
the post-1992 period we obtain a point estimate of 0.042, statistically insignificant.
Yet, when GDP is proxied by satellite light, we find that the establishment of a SEZ
triggers a 5.2% increase in light intensity. The point estimate for the inland sample
is similar in magnitude, albeit statistically insignificant.
We also check the robustness of our results by using electricity consumption as a
proxy of economic activity (see, e.g., Rawski 2001). Data on electricity consumption
by households and firms are reported in the same statistical yearbooks as GDP, and
is available at the city level. In column (3) of Table 10 we re-run our baseline
regression using the logarithm of electricity consumption as the dependent variable.
The result shows that the establishment of a SEZ is associated with an 11% increase
in electricity consumption. The raw elasticity of GDP with respect to electricity
consumption in our sample is 0.91, such that the estimated effect would translate
into a 10% increase in the GDP level.29
27Elvidge et al. (1997) are among the first to discuss the relationship between light and economic activity.
See also Henderson et al. (2012) and Chen and Nordhaus (2011) and the literature cited there on the use of
light to measure economic activity. Ma et al. (2012) and Ha¨lg (2012) discuss the use of light data in Chinese
prefecture-level cities.
28We do not control for the size of the land area in the regressions in columns (3) and (4) because light is
measured within the city boundaries of 2010. Therefore, unlike for the official GDP data, the area on which
we measure economic activity is held constant over the years.
29However, we find no significant effect in the inland sample. We suspect that this is due to the poor
quality of electricity data in this subsample, for which we have no explanation. We calculated the correlation
between GDP (data) and electricity separately in four sub-samples: inland reformers, inland non-reformers,
coastal reformers and coastal non-reformers. The correlation is high and significant in all subsamples except
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C. Controlling for Government Spending
The establishment of a SEZ is likely to have been associated with a number of
policy changes from the central and local governments. Most notably, the central
or the provincial government may increase the transfers to cities when these are
granted SEZ status. Unfortunately, we have no direct information on such transfers.
SEZ may have also triggered government investments in infrastructure. The effects
identified in the previous sections are gross of such investments. On the one hand,
the infrastructure investments are part of the government’s strategy to facilitate
economic development and therefore are part of the treatment. On the other hand,
one may be interested in estimating the net effects after controlling for changes in
public investments.
While we have no information on public investments at the city level, we do ob-
serve the overall expenditures of the local government for a subset of the years in
our sample. This measure can be used as a proxy of the contribution of public
investments to GDP. The disadvantage of including the local government expendi-
ture is twofold. First, we lose some observations. Second, causation could run in
the opposite direction: government expenditure might have increased because the
GDP expansion caused by the SEZ increased the tax revenue accruing to the local
authorities.
Table 11 shows that the reform effects are robust to the inclusion of government
expenditure among the control variables. The effect of the reform remains positive
and highly significant in both samples, and is in fact larger than the point estimates
in Table 3.
D. Earlier GDP Data
Our main analysis focuses on the period 1988-2010 for which the NBS provides a
consistent measurement across cities and years. This conservative approach entails
the cost of losing variation in the reform variable, since some SEZ were established
before 1988. We re-estimate our baseline specification for a subset of cities for which
GDP is also available for earlier years.30 In this case, we cannot control for changes
in land area, government spending and population as this data is missing for the
earlier years. The reform effect estimated with this subsample is a 12.3% increase
in the level of GDP, and the estimated coefficient is highly significant.
E. Population Data
In our analysis so far, we have used the population data from the City Statistical
Yearbooks. To the best of our knowledge, these data cover only the registered pop-
ulation in the city, that is, people with ”hukou”. The existence of a large number of
non-resident immigrant workers in the cities could potentially bias our estimation.
To address this issue, we check first the CSY statistics against the population cen-
sus that in principle should record the entire resident population at the city level.
However, as noted above, census data are only available for three years (1990, 2000
for that of inland reformers where the elasticity of GDP with respect to electricity is very low (0.02) and
statistically insignificant. Interestingly, the correlation between GDP (data) and satellite light intensity is
instead consistent and significant across the four sub-samples, suggesting that the source of problems is not
the GDP statistics, but rather the electricity data.
30Namely the cities in the following provinces: Fujian, Guizhou, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Henan, Inner Mon-
golia, Jiangsu, Shaanxi, Shandong and Shanxi.
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and 2010) in our sample. We find that there is a gap between the two data sources.
In particular, if the census is right, the population growth rate is overestimated by
an annual 0.24% in non-reforming cities, and underestimated by 0.35% in reforming
cities in the city statistics. The observation that the population is underestimated
in the treatment group and overestimated in the control group is not surprising, as
the treatment cities are likely to have attracted many non-hukou workers from the
control group.
To test the robustness of our baseline results, we repeat the baseline regressions
of Table 3 restricting our sample to the three census years and using population
census data instead of population CSY data. Columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6) of Table
12 simply replicate the results in Table 3 in the restricted sample. In column (3)
and (7) of Table 12, where population is used as a control variable, the estimated
effect of SEZ is found to be highly significant and of similar magnitude to that of
the baseline specification in Table 3 (although the estimated coefficient drops from
0.18 to 0.13 in the inland sample). In the specification using output per capita as
the dependent variable (column (4) and (8)), the effects of SEZ on per capita GDP
are somewhat smaller than in the corresponding columns of Table 3 (the effect being
8% and the full sample and 10% in the inland sample). The estimates continue to
be statistically significant, albeit only at the 95% confidence level in the full sample
and at the 90% confidence level in the inland sample. It is important to note that
by restricting the sample to only three years, we lose precision in the time variation
of the treatment effect.31 This could explain part of the reduction in the estimated
treatment effect. In addition, the estimates including non-hukou workers should be
regarded as a lower bound of the effect, since these workers on average carry a lower
human capital than officially resident workers. All in all, our baseline results appear
to be robust to using the resident population data from the census.
F. Placebo Analysis
Our estimation exploits the time and spatial variation in the establishment of SEZ.
Since the establishment of the SEZ is staggered, but clustered in few years, there
could be concern about the extent to which the exact timing of the reform matters
for the identification of the reform effect. Furthermore, we would like to rule out that
our reform indicators pick up shocks unrelated to SEZ that could be present also
in other cities. In order to deal with these concerns, we run three placebo exercises
based on the specification in column 3 of Table 3, but assign reform years randomly.
In a first exercise, we assign the actual number of new zone establishments in each
year to a random selection of cities. The resulting placebo distribution is the same
as the true distribution over time, but SEZ are assigned artificially to random cities.
We repeat this exercise 1000 times. We find that in no case are the absolute t values
and the R-squared of the placebo regressions larger than those of the true reform.32
This suggests that the spatial distribution of SEZ indeed drives our result.
In a second more demanding placebo test, we assign the random reforms only to
reformers, again holding the distribution of reforms across years constant. However,
the timing of the treatment is scrambled across cities. This allows us to assess the
31Consider, for instance, columns (5)-(6), which involve no population data. The estimated coefficients
in Table 3 are 0.27 and 0.21, respectively, whereas the corresponding coefficients in Table 12 are 0.22 and
0.15, repectively.
32The mean estimate of the placebo reform is -0.0004 and it is never significant and higher than the one
of the true reform.
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extent to which the time dimension of the reform matters, because we are only
randomizing the year of the reform but not the treated city. We find that the
absolute t-values are higher when using the year of the true reform than in the
placebo regressions in all but 1.8% of the cases.33 This indicates that the actual
year in which the SEZ were implemented is critical for our results, and supports our
identification strategy based on within-city variation.
Finally, we use the random assignment of reforms from above and include the true
reform year and the placebo reform year in the same regression.34 While the estimate
for the true reform is always significant at 5%, the placebo reforms are significant in
only 24% of the cases.35 Overall, these placebo exercises strengthen our confidence
in the empirical strategy used. Both the spatial and the time variation of the SEZ
appear to be important for the results.
G. Alternative Clustering Strategies
In our main analysis we cluster standard error at the city level, to allow for ob-
servations within a given city to be correlated as well as for heteroskedasticity. Our
results are robust to alternative clustering strategies. First, we cluster the stan-
dard errors by province and year of reform (i.e., the first year in which a city hosts
a SEZ). This strategy takes account of the fact that the introduction of SEZ is
highly clustered in time. Many HIDZ were introduced in 1991–92, and many ETDZ
were introduced in 2001–03, implying that different cities in these years cannot be
treated as independent observations. The results are essentially unchanged. Online
appendix Tables A1-A2-A3-A4-A5 and appendix Figures A2-A3 yield the analogues
of Tables 3-4-5-6-7 and of Figures 3-4 under the alternative clustering strategy. The
results are robust: the statistical significance of the coefficients of interests is even
strengthened, and in a few cases coefficients that were marginally insignificant when
clustering at the city level turn significant here. Most notably, this is the case of
appendix Figure A2, the analogue of Figure 3, capturing the lagged effect of reforms
in the inland sample.
We also run the regressions clustering standard errors at the province level (instead
of province×year of first reform). This strategy is even more demanding, and runs
into potential problems since we have only 28 provinces in the full sample and 18
provinces in the inland sample, and so the number of clusters is small. The results
are robust to even this demanding approach. The coefficients of interests in appendix
Tables A6-A7-A8-A9-A10 and the lagged reform effects in appendix Figure A4-A5
remain significant with 2 exceptions, both of which occur in specifications using the
inland sample. 36
VI. Conclusion
China has experienced an astonishing economic development over the past 30
years. The SEZ are a building block of the development strategy pursued by its
33The mean estimate of the placebo reform is 0.088. The placebo specification yields significant coefficients
in only 5% of the draws. It yields higher point estimates than the specification with the true reform year in
5% of the draws.
34The assignment of random reform years among reformers implies that a placebo reform year is likely to
coincide with the true reform year. This is the case in 36% of the 1000 draws.
35The mean estimate of the true reform is 0.11 and the mean estimate of the placebo reform is 0.046.
36The exceptions are: policy indicators of state-leve zone in column (7) of Table A8 and column (7) of
Table A9.
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government. According to Naughton (2007): ”Bold, fragmented, open to outside
investment, but with a strong role for government: Special Economic Zones typify
much of the Chinese transition process” (p. 410). This paper estimates the effect
of SEZ on local economic performance. We considered a number of specifications
that control for unobserved heterogeneity at the city level and at the province-time
level. The results suggest that the establishment of SEZ has yielded large positive
effects for the cities in which these were located. Although our estimates are smaller
than those found by the earlier literature based on cross-sectional growth regressions
(typically on a smaller set of cities and years), the effects are sizeable and robust. We
also find that the effect of the SEZ on output worked mainly through the acceleration
of physical capital investment – although there is some indication of positive effects
on TFP and human capital accumulation.
What can we learn from the Chinese experience about the role of economic reform
and industrial policy during the process of development? Existing theoretical and
empirical work suggests that policies and institutions should be ”appropriate” to the
stage of development, and particularly to the stage of the process of technological
convergence (Acemoglu et al. 2006). The Chinese reform process was characterized
by a mixture of elements of market liberalization and an active role of government in
promoting investment and technology adoption. Rodrik (2006) argues that the ac-
tive role of the government was crucial for China’s development because it supported
a fast move towards more modern and productive sectors which have positive ex-
ternalities on the whole economy. The results of our empirical analysis suggest that
the industrial policy may have indeed been a catalyst of the development process.
At the same time, the estimated effects are not quantitatively very large relative to
the high growth rates experienced by China in this period. Therefore, it would be
hazardous to conclude that SEZ were the most important component of the reform
package.
Two limitations to recall are that (i) we cannot quantify the costs of the policy,
and thus the judgment about the welfare effects of SEZ must remain suspended; (ii)
by design, our methodology can only uncover differential effects. If the establish-
ment of SEZ had positive spillovers outside of the areas where they were introduced,
our estimates represent a lower bound of the actual effects. In spite of these lim-
itations, we believe that our results provide a useful starting point for a realistic
understanding of the effects of industrial policy in China.
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Table 1: State and Province Level Zones in 3 Provinces
Province #S #P Avg indus-output share of S Avg indus-output share of P
Jiangsu 12 113 3.13% 0.55%
Guangdong 14 56 4.89% 0.56%
Zhejiang 8 57 4.09% 1.18%
Source: WEFore (2010). The table displays the number of state level development zones (#S) and province
level development zones (#P) in three provinces: Jiangsu, Guangdong and Zhejiang. In the last two columns,
it also displays the average share of the state level and province level zones in the industrial output of each
province. The data is for the year 2009.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Real GDP (mil) 10388.9 21776.23 116.62 414700.53 5147
Growth of real GDP (%) 13.07 18.13 -52.19 594.78 4738
Land area (sq km) 1728.36 2028.58 25 20169 5159
Growth of land area (%) 8.44 170.69 -93.23 9852 4750
Population (mil) 1.01 0.87 0.1 8.01 5275
Growth of population (%) 2.71 17.97 -77.18 586.19 4876
Electricity consumption (GWh) 3.08 4.71 0.01 56.3 5085
Growth of electricity consumption (%) 17.41 202.25 -98.97 13486.34 4674
Mean light intensity (calibrated) 13.32 11.27.4 0.12 64.38 4435
Growth of light intensity (calibrated) (%) 5.22 13.98 -38.93 124.57 4178
Note: The table shows the descriptive statistics of our main variables in our sample of 276 cities in 25
provinces. Real GDP is derived from city-level nominal GDP and provincial deflators. Land area is the offical
size of the prefecture level cities. Population includes registered residents only. Electricity consumption is
by households and firms. Mean light intensity is the average brightness of pixels in the city.
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Figure 1: Share of prefecture level cities with different types of zones: The figure shows the share of cities
which have different types of SEZ: Hightech Industrial Development Zones, Economic and Technolocial
Development Zones, Export Processing Zones, Bonded Zones, Border Economic Cooperation Zones, and
other types. The sample is restricted to 107 cities that are observed in all years between 1988 and 2010.
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Figure 1: Share of prefecture level cities with different types of zones: The figure shows the share of cities
which have different types of SEZ: Hightech Industrial Development Zones, Economic and Technolocial
Development Zones, Export Processing Zones, Bonded Zones, Border Economic Cooperation Zones, and
other types. The sample is restricted to 107 cities that are observed in all years between 1988 and 2010.
39
Figure 2: Location of treated cities in 2010: The map shows the boundaries of Chinese prefecture level
cities and counties in 2010. The cities in our sample with at least one state-level SEZ in 2010 are marked in
red (a city may have more than one zone).
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Figure 3: Reform effects over time: The bars show the coefficients of a regression of the logarithm of
nominal GDP on indicators for years before and after the first zone. The solid and dashed lines show the
confidence interval. The vertical dashed line at 19 shows when the reformers from 1991 reach 2010 and
subsequently the number of observations to identify post-reform indicators drops to 9. The regression also
controls for an indicator for province-level zones, land area, population, city fixed effects, and province-time
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by city. The sample includes 276 cities from 25 provinces for the
period 1988-2010.
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Figure 4: Reform effects over time: The bars show the coefficients of a regression of the logarithm of
nominal GDP on indicators for years before and after the first zone. The solid and dashed lines show the
confidence interval. The vertical dashed line at 19 shows when the reformers from 1991 reach 2010 and
subsequently the number of observations to identify post-reform indicators drops to 9. The regression also
controls for an indicator for province-level zones, land area, population, city fixed effects, and province-time
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by city. The sample includes 158 cities from 18 inland provinces
(as defined in the online appendix) for the period 1988-2010.
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Figure 5: Effects on GDP per capita over time: The bars show the coefficients of a regression of the
logarithm of GDP per capita on indicators for years before and after the first SEZ was established. The
solid and dashed lines show the confidence interval. The vertical dashed line at 19 shows when the reformers
from 1991 reach 2010 and subsequently the number of observations to identify post-reform indicators drops
to 9. The regression uses data at the prefecture level and also controls for an indicator for province-level
zones, land area of the prefecture, prefecture fixed effects, and province-time fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered by prefecture. The sample includes 276 cities from 25 provinces for the period 1988-2010.
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Figure 6: Effects on physical capital per capita over time: The bars show the coefficients of a regression
of the logarithm of physical capital per capita on indicators for years before and after the first SEZ was
established. The solid and dashed lines show the confidence interval. The vertical dashed line at 19 shows
when the reformers from 1991 reach 2010 and subsequently the number of observations to identify post-
reform indicators drops to 9. The regression uses data at the prefecture level and also controls for an
indicator for province-level zones, land area of the prefecture, prefecture fixed effects, and province-time
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by prefecture. The sample includes 276 cities from 25 provinces
for the period 1988-2010.
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Figure 6: Effects on physical capital per capita over time: The bars show the coefficients of a regression
of the logarithm of physical capital per capita on indicators for years before and after the first SEZ was
established. The solid and dashed lines show the confidence interval. The vertical dashed line at 19 shows
when the reformers from 1991 reach 2010 and subsequently the number of observations to identify post-
reform indicators drops to 9. The regression uses data at the prefecture level and also controls for an
indicator for province-level zones, land area of the prefecture, prefecture fixed effects, and province-time
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by prefecture. The sample includes 276 cities from 25 provinces
for the period 1988-2010.
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Figure 7: Effects on TFP over time: The bars show the coefficients of a regression of the logarithm of
TFP on indicators for years before and after the first SEZ was established. The solid and dashed lines show
the confidence interval. The vertical dashed line at 19 shows when the reformers from 1991 reach 2010
and subsequently the number of observations to identify post-reform indicators drops to 9. The regression
uses data at the prefecture level and also controls for an indicator for province-level zones, land area of
the prefecture, prefecture fixed effects, and province-time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by
prefecture. The sample includes 276 cities from 25 provinces for the period 1988-2010.
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Figure A5: Reform effects over time: The bars show the coefficients of a regression of the logarithm of
nominal GDP on indicators for years before and after the first zone. The solid and dashed lines show the
confidence interval. The vertical dashed line at 19 shows when the reformers from 1991 reach 2010 and
subsequently the number of observations to identify post-reform indicators drops to 9. The regression also
controls for an indicator for province-level zones, land area, population, city fixed effects, and province-year
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by province. The sample includes 158 cities from 18 inland
provinces (as defined in the online appendix) for the period 1988-2010.
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7: Effects on TFP over ti e: he ars s t ffi i f
TFP on indicators for years befor and a ter the firs SEZ was established. The soli and dashed lines show
the confidence interval. The vertic l dashed line at 19 shows when the reformers from 1991 reach 2010
and subsequently the number of observations to identify post-reform indicators drops to 9. The regression
uses data at the prefecture level and also controls for an indicator for province-level zones, land area of
the pref ure, prefectur fixed effects, an province-time fix d effects. Standard errors are clustered by
efecture. The sample includes 276 cities from 25 provinces for the period 1988-2010.
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